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IN THE SUPREME COU2T OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---oooOooo--SANDRA D. FUNK and
ROBERT A. YOUlJG,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Supreme Court No. 15,937

vs.
WILLIAN R. YOUNG,
Defendant and Respondent.
---oooOooo--BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
---oooOooo--NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for judicial sale of real property
located in Salt Lake County, under the partition statute or
equity jurisdiction, and for a division of the proceeds, with
provision made for the life tenant, who has joined with a
remainderman as plaintiffs.
DISPOSITION Ill THE LOWER COURT
The lower court dismissed the complaint on defendant's
Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
'l'HL !'1\Tl!RL 0F REL,IEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-Respondents request this court to reverse
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Lilce tr LJl court
cltll1 and
to Technology
tyc'rnti Act,
t administered
tlle matter
Library Services
by the Utahto
Stateproceed.
Library.
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- 2 STATEMENT OF FACTS
There being no transcript or evidence taken, and
the matter having been detcrmineu from a reviev1 of the
verified complaint, the statement of facts consists of a
review of the verified complaint and the Decree recited
therein previously entered in Probate No.
District Court, Salt Lake County, in the
Estate of Stella J. Young, Deceased.

56044, Third
f~tter

of the

The facts are set

forth in numbered paragraphs to aid in reference.
1.
J. Young,

In a probate decree for the Estate of Stella

dece2se~.

~er

and defenuanc_ ,.

·nilJren, plaintiff Sandra D. Funk
.·:·,_.ng, were granted a remainder

interest as tenants in common of a home located in Salt Lake
City.

The decree also provided that plaintiff Robert A.

Young was to have a life estate in the home, subject to
his personally residing at the home, and to his repair and
maintenance of the premises and his paying the utilities,
taxes, and special assessments.
2.

The parties are adults, and except for the

life estate in the home, pl;cunti ff Robert A. Young, a
spendthrift, received nothinJ more from the estate, the
balance being divided

cquall~

to plaintiff

and defendant \lillio.m H. Youree;.

Sand~a

D. Funk
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3.

3 -

In order to utilize the home, plaintiff Sandra

D. Funk has expended some $5,000 on permanent improvements,
and to assist her brother Robert, she has paid the expenses
for maintaining the home.

However, she does not have the

necessary funds to bring the home up to reasonable insulRtion
standards to reduce the rising utility costs to utilize the
home.
4.

The value of the property at the time of the

probate was listed in the appraisal in July, 1971, as
$7,500.

The valueof the property at the time of the filing

of the complaint was $40,000, net proceeds from the sale
of the same, based upon an offer to purchase received in
c.Jovember, 1977, including the improvements made by Sandra
D. Funk, and acquiesed in by defendant William R. Young.
5.

There are no liens or obligations against the

6.

Plaintiff Sandra D. Funk desires to sell the

property.

home and purchase a more suitable residence for plaintiff
Robert A. Young, in which he would receive a life estate
similar to that he currently enjoys from his mother's estate.
Defendant William R. Young has refused to cooperate in the
sale of the home and to accept an adjusted payment for his
vested remainder interest.
7.

Slncc the property consists of a house and a
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- 4 lot, partition of the property, taking into account the life
estate, would not be possible.
8.

The prayer for relief sought an order of the

Court for sale of the property through a referee, and for
an apportionment of the proceeds, taking into account the
improvements paid for by plaintiff Sandra o. Funk, and
taking into account the remaining value of the life estate,
and with payment of the adjusted portions to defendant
and plaintiff Sandra D. Funk, with the restriction on the
plaintiff's proceeds that the same be used to purchase a
suitable habitation for the plaintiff Robert A. Young,
which contains a life estate as provided in the original
probate decree.
ARGUI-'lENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE
OF ACTION UNDER THE UTAH PARTITION STATUTE.
The Utah partition statute provides as follows:
78-39-l. When several cotenants hold and
are in possession of real property as joint
tenants or tenants in co~non, in which one or
more of them have an estate of inheritance,
or for life or lives, or for years, an action
may be brought by one or more of such persons
for a partition thereof according to the
respective rights of the persons interested
therein, and for a sale of such property or a
part thereof, if it appears that a partition
cannot be made without gr-eat lJrejudicc to the
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The parties to this action arc the sole owners of the
property.

The life tenant, subject to defeasance for

failure to meet conditions of paying taxes, residing in
the home, maintaining and repairing the same, and paying
any assessments, during his tenancy, meets the requirements
of the statute.

The two remaindermen are vested and shall

receive the property upon failure of the life estate,
lllcnce they meet the requirements of the statute.
The trial court indicated that the difficulty
vJith the plaintiffs' position is that the remaindermen are
not in possession, and thus may not maintain any cause
under the partition statute.
This Court has not specifically defined the meaning
of the words

"in possession 11

•

However, it has ruled, in

Larsen v. Daynes, 102 Utah 312, 133 P.2d 785 (1943),
_reversi_223. 102 Utah 305, 122 P.2d 429

(1942), that:

The court has power to partition, sell or
settle the respective property rights of persons
interested in real property.
Sec. 104-58-1
ct seq., R. s. u. 1933.
[Sec. 104-58-1, R.S.U. 1933,
is identical with present partition section
78-39-1, cited above.]

_f__::l.,

at.

3Li.

In the Larsen case the Court overruled a demurrer
(motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim) to a complaint
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-6requesting partition or sale of the plaintiff's

propert~

because he could not transfer the same as it was
encumbered by a contingent interest in plaintiff's clivDrced
spouse of l/3 of the plaintiff's property if she survived
him.
In the instant case, the plaintiff Robert A.
Young, has a possessory estate, a life estate, and is
in fact in possession.
and William R.

The estates of Sandra D. Funk

Young are estates of inheritance, are

vested, are alienable, and enjoyment is merely postpone0
until the death of William R. Young, or sooner if he
fails to meet: ....

1t:·

-=

~r-~-=r

contingencies.

cc~,~otes

These remainder

permitted at corrunon la•tJ as

remainder interests until the Statute of Uses permitted
executory interests, such as the contingent remainder
terminated in the Larsen case.
The lanquage of the partition statute provides
for partition, inter alia, where joint tenants, ln posses-

sion, in which one or more oF them have an estate of inheritance, huve the property interest.

I!O'i·iever.,

at common

joint tenancy is not an "estate of inheritance".
Babbitt v. Day, 5 A. 275, 276, 41

~l.J.Eq.,

ln.~,,,

Sec

14 StcvJ.

<92.

On the other hand, a vested remainder after a life
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- 7 estate is an "estate of inheritance."

See Brown v. Fidelity

Union Trust Co., 9 A.2d 311, 327, 126 N.J.Eq. 406 (1939); and
Bunting v. Spcek, 21 P.

288, 290, 41 Kan. 424, 3 L.R.A. 690 (1889),

citing Smith v. West, 103 Ill. 332.

Thus it would appear

that the statute is at best ambiguous.
The one argument which would be most pursuasive
against allowing this partition suit to proceed would be
if the remaindermen attempted to defeat the life estate
of the life tenant in possession.

However, in the instant

case, the life tenant in possession has joined as plaintiff
to effect sale and distribution of the property, thus
avoiding the argument that a possessory interest has
oeen

impro~erly

disturbed.

See,

~~·,

Ripp v. Ripp,

314 N.Y.S.2d 461, 463, 64 t1isc.2d 323 (1970), wherein the court
denied partition to an out of possession remainderman
ex-husbc:md who attempted to defeat the possession of the
life tenant former spouse.

However, in the Larsen case,

lh1s Court permitted such partition or sale where
initiatccd by thee estate holder in possession.
POINT II.
EQUITY PEHMITS PARTITION OR SALE
IF THERE IS NO LEGAL REMEDY.
In the event this Court is constrained to hold
l_hc~t

the Uta!' statute on partition does not allmv for
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the relief sought in plaintiffs' complaint, the chancery
courts would have allowed such relief, and under its
equity jurisdiction, the lower court could have provided
the relief prayed for in the complaint.
In the concurring opinions to the Larsen case
it was stated as follows:
I think our statute on partition was not
intended t.o so circumscribe or restrict the
remedy that relief cannot be granted under the
facts pleaded in this case.
See 47 C.J. 338,
§ 171, and cases there cited.
Why should we
hold that one who owns and is in possession
of a two-thirds interest in property in fee
cannot apply to the courts to partition the
property as against one ~ill holds a contingent
remai"ier in the other one-third interest? I
':l-:ic: the chancery
courts would have granted
-~~.t1cn in such cases and that our statute
:,jt i;-~Ucndcd to diminish or restrict the
rigLt as recognized by the chancery courts.
The use and improvement of real estate is too
vital to the public welfare to be hampered by
rules or restrictions which have no foundation
in justice or sound public policy.
Id., at 317, Boyt, D.,T., concurring.
In addition to the equitable considerations, this
situation was created through a IVill and an order of the
probate division of court.

It lvould be reasonable for

the court to continue supervision overfue property left
to a spendthrift, and to retain jurisdiction for t 11at
purpose.

The unreasonable refusal of a remaindermar, joint
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heir to release his interest for a fair payment in order
to facilitate justice, should be sufficient grounds to
permit the court to exercise its jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The complaint herein states a cause of action
under several different

t~eories.

One avenue for relief

in this matter for the plaintiff Sandra D. Funk, is to
persuade her brother, plaintiff Robert

A. Young, to

move out of the house, thus terminating the life estate
from failure of a condition.

At that point, she could

then commence an action because she would be a tenant
in common with her brcther, defendant lhlliam R. Young.
This would leave plaintiff Robert A. Young without a
fair remedy and would disinherit him from his mother's
estate.

It cannot be that the courts must insist that

he risk his sister's good graces to provide for him and
abandon his inheritance because the courts would not
respond to his plea.
DATED this lst c'ay of September, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,

Plaintiffs-Appellants
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